

Losing Hurts: The Happiness Impact of Partisan Electoral Loss

Lamar Pierce,* Todd Rogers[†] and Jason A. Snyder[‡]

Abstract

Partisan identity shapes social, mental, economic, and physical life. Using a novel dataset, we study the consequences of partisan identity by examining the immediate impact of electoral loss and victory on happiness and sadness. Employing a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity model we present two primary findings. First, elections strongly affect the immediate happiness/sadness of partisan losers, but minimally impact partisan winners. This effect is consistent with psychological research on the good-bad hedonic asymmetry, but appears to dissipate within a week after the election. Second, the immediate happiness consequences to partisan losers are relatively strong. To illustrate, we show that partisans are affected two times more by their party losing the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election than both respondents with children were to the Newtown shootings and respondents living in Boston were to the Boston Marathon bombings. We discuss implications regarding the centrality of partisan identity to the self and its well-being.

Keywords: Partisanship, political psychology, happiness, elections, identity, well-being, Obama.

How important is partisan identity to happiness? It might be of considerable importance to the two-thirds of Americans who identify with a political party, given its powerful influence on other dimensions of people's lives. Partisan identity is stable across people's lifetimes (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002), causally shaping

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*Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive Box 1133, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA, e-mail: pierce@wustl.edu

[†]Harvard Kennedy School, Mailbox 124, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA

[‡]Anderson School of Management, UCLA, 110 Westwood Plaza, Cornell Hall, Suite D506, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA

23 political preferences and the factual qualities people associate with policies (Cohen
24 2003). People more frequently live near (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2004; Glaeser and
25 Ward 2006) and interact with (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011) those who share their
26 partisan identity than with those who do not. Furthermore, partisan identity tends
27 to define media consumption (Prior 2007) and other economic behavior (Gerber
28 and Huber 2009), and can bias social perceptions and favoritism (Caruso et al. 2009;
29 Rand et al. 2009). In short, social, mental, economic, and physical life is shaped by
30 partisan identity.

31 Given this importance, political outcomes such as the 2012 U.S. Presidential
32 Election could profoundly impact the happiness of both partisan winners
33 (Democrats) and partisan losers (Republicans). This research uses a novel dataset
34 that tracks fluctuations in happiness and sadness to address two questions about
35 the importance of partisan identity to well-being. First, are the shocks to happiness
36 from winning and losing equivalent? Diverse research suggests they might not be.
37 Bad events cause stronger reactions than comparable good ones (Baumeister et al.
38 2001; Rozin and Royzman 2001), similar to predictions from prospect theory's value
39 function about the gain-loss asymmetry (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; McDermott
40 2004).

41 Second, how strong is the shock of partisan loss to happiness? We compare
42 the well-being consequences of partisan loss to that of two national tragedies
43 that dominated the national news media for weeks. On December 14, 2012,
44 20 children and 6 adults were fatally shot at Sandy Hook Elementary School
45 in Newtown, Connecticut ("Newtown shootings"). On April 15, 2013, three
46 people were killed and 283 injured after terrorists attacked the Boston Marathon
47 ("marathon bombings"). While such tragedies are qualitatively different than
48 elections, comparing their well-being consequences to that of partisan loss illustrates
49 simply the relative importance of the partisan identity to well-being. Tragedies have
50 both political repercussions (Gillis 1996) and elicit emotional, financial, and civic
51 responses from people not directly affected by the trauma (Preston and De Waal
52 2002; Singer et al. 2004). Consequently, one might sensibly expect the hedonic
53 (happiness-based) impact of partisan loss to pale in comparison.

54 Using daily responses from CivicScience, Inc., an online polling and data
55 intelligence company, we employ a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity
56 (RD) design to estimate the happiness shock of specific events. The RD design
57 overcomes many of the sampling bias problems in survey-based studies of happiness
58 by focusing on nearly identical respondents immediately before and after an
59 independent shock (Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Shadish et al. 2002).

60 We find that the pain of losing an election is much larger than the joy of winning
61 one, but that this happiness loss is short-lived. Election outcomes strongly affect the
62 short-term happiness/sadness of partisan losers, with minimal impact on partisan
63 winners. This result is consistent with studies finding that "bad emotions, bad
64 parents, and bad feedback have more impact than good ones . . . bad information is
65 processed more thoroughly than good . . . [and] the self is more motivated to avoid

66 bad self-definitions than to pursue good ones” (Baumeister et al. 2001). Despite
67 the strength of the loss, happiness appears to recover within a week, consistent
68 with research on people’s tendency to adapt to bad events more quickly than
69 expected (Gilbert et al. 2004). This temporariness suggests partisan loss impairs
70 emotional well-being rather than broader life satisfaction (Kahneman and Deaton
71 2010).

72 The short-term strength of partisan loss is contrasted with responses to mass
73 national tragedies; partisans are affected twice as much by their candidate losing
74 the U.S. Presidential Election than both respondents with children were to the
75 Newtown shootings and respondents in Boston were to the marathon bombings.
76 The fact that the pain experienced by partisan losers is stronger than that of people
77 for whom the tragedies were self-relevant benchmarks the centrality of partisan
78 identity to the self and well-being.

79 METHOD

80 Data

81 CivicScience polls over 300,000 unique individuals daily across the United States
82 on over 500 third-party websites. Unpaid volunteers answer three questions in
83 embedded polls. Tracking technology allows the company to identify returning
84 respondents across all partner websites, thereby collecting a panel of detailed
85 demographic and attitudinal data for many respondents. One question that is
86 randomly and continuously distributed across all partner websites each day asks
87 “*How happy are you today – very happy, happy, so so, unhappy, or very unhappy?*” This
88 question is similar to one used in the Euro-Barometer Survey Series and the United
89 States General Social Survey—widely used to study happiness in economics (Alesina
90 et al. 2004; Argyle 2003; Di Tella et al. 2003; Easterlin 2003, 2006). Consistent with
91 the prior literature, we create an indicator variable “happy” equal to 1 if respondents
92 reported being happy or very happy.¹

93 CivicScience also collects extensive socio-demographic information (e.g., gender,
94 income, race, age, and partisan identity) in a pre-determined sequence from return
95 respondents over multiple visits to partner websites. We had access to data on
96 all respondents who had answered the happiness and sadness questions, but
97 not all of these respondents answered all socio-demographic, party affiliation,
98 and parental status questions. For example, for the week before and after the
99 election approximately 67% of respondents with happiness responses and full
100 socio-demographic data had answered the partisan identity question; 85% of
101 such respondents from the week before and after Newtown had answered the

¹This dichotomized variable is easier to interpret and more meaningful than a 1–5 scale assuming each unit change is equal. Tables S7A and S7B in the supplementary materials present similar results with the scaled dependent variable.




Figure 1
Self-Reported Happiness one Week Before and After the Election

102 parental status question. Missing responses for each question yields a sparse data
 103 matrix, which makes imputing missing data very unreliable. We therefore, restrict
 104 the data for each analysis to the respondents for whom there are no missing
 105 observations.

106 CivicScience asks “*Politically, do you consider yourself more of a: Republican,*
 107 *Democrat, or Independent?*” Like all surveys, the sample of these individuals
 108 is conditioned on the decision to participate in repeated CivicScience polls.
 109 CivicScience respondents were somewhat more Republican than the general
 110 population. We are unable to observe data on which respondents chose not to
 111 answer specific questions. Figure 1 previews our core results. During the two weeks
 112 surrounding Election Day, an average of 210 Republicans and 111 Democrats
 113 answered an online happiness question each day. Notice the little change in the
 114 likelihood that Democrats report being happy, while immediately following the
 115 election Republicans’ self-reported happiness drops from approximately 60% to
 116 30%. These data are collected with enough frequency that daily shocks can be clearly
 117 identified, a feature unique to most research on happiness. We note, however, that our
 118 models’ key identifying assumption is that the sample is similar before and after the
 119 election. Additionally, given the self-selection and uneven geographic distribution
 120 of the sample, one must be careful in extrapolating specific effect magnitudes to the
 121 general population. Finally, we note how days are coded. Across all studies, we code
 122 days as being 24-hour periods immediately preceding and following focal events.
 123 For instance, the 2012 presidential election was called by the Associated Press at
 124 approximately 11 PM EST on Election Day, so the previous day began at 11 PM
 125 EST the day before Election Day.

126 **Model**

127 We use quasi-experimental RD models to test how the happiness levels of Democrats
 128 and Republicans discretely change immediately following the presidential election.
 129 RD models assign observations to treatment and control groups based on a discrete
 130 threshold in a continuous assignment variable, which in our case is time (days).
 131 The discrete threshold is the focal event (e.g., Election Day or day of the tragedy).
 132 Any response after the focal event threshold is considered “treated,” while prior
 133 days are in the “control.” RD models are most commonly used in political science,
 134 economics, and psychology (Dal Bó et al. 2009; Gerber et al. 2011; Hersh 2014;
 135 Pierce et al. 2013; Snyder 2010), with many examples applying RD models to time
 136 series data, as we do (Busse et al. 2006; Pierce and Snyder 2012).

137 RD models assume that observations just above and below the threshold are
 138 identical on all dimensions except the focal treatment. Table S1–S3 provides detailed
 139 evidence that respondents one week before and after the three events in our data
 140 are reasonably identical on observable dimensions. Simple t-tests of differences in
 141 pre/post means reveal few systematic demographic differences, nor do RD models
 142 that replace *Happiness* with each demographic as the dependent variable in Equation
 143 (1) below. Our base specification is as follows at the individual-level respondent:

$$Happiness_i = \alpha + \beta_1 * PostEvent_i + \beta_2 * Linear\ Time\ Variable_i + \beta_3 * PostEvent_i * Linear\ Time\ Variable_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

144 *Linear Time Variable* runs from -7 to 6 , where 0 is the day immediately following
 145 the focal event. *PostEvent* is an indicator equal to 1 if the event has already occurred.
 146 Figure 2 illustrates this specification for Republican respondents’ happiness in
 147 relation to the election. β_1 estimates the discrete jump between the two regression
 148 estimates. β_2 is the slope prior to the election and β_3 is the slope after the election.
 149 This specification therefore estimates the size of the break while controlling for the
 150 different time trends before and after the event. Other specifications include socio-
 151 demographic characteristics and higher order time polynomials for robustness. All
 152 results are clustered at the MSA level.

153 To test the persistence of the happiness effect, a second model relaxes the RD
 154 assumption to examine weekly happiness rates for Republicans and Democrats,
 155 conditioning on socio-demographic information and location. Although this model
 156 provides some evidence of effect persistence, we cannot observe the counterfactual
 157 time trend in weeks distant from Election Day. Any inference about effect length
 158 must assume that happiness would return to pre-election levels absent the election’s
 159 effect.

$$Happiness_i = \alpha + \beta_1 * Week\ Indicators_i + \beta_2 * Socio\ Demographic\ Controls + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

160

Table 1(a)
Democrat Happiness One Week Surrounding 2012 Election

Independent variables	Dependent variable: Are you happy today?				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-election	0.039 (0.049)	0.033* (0.019)	0.037 (0.047)	0.049 (0.052)	0.084 (0.137)
Post-election* One degree polynomial of days	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Post-election* Three degree polynomial of days	No	No	No	No	Yes
Socio - Demographic & MSA Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Sample	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats
Time restriction	+/- one day	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week
Observations	265	1,553	1,553	1,553	1,553

Table 1(b)
Republican Happiness One Week Surrounding 2012 Election

Independent variables	Dependent variable: Are you happy today?				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(6)
Post-election	-0.310*** (0.040)	-0.151*** (0.016)	-0.243*** (0.035)	-0.246*** (0.039)	-0.316*** (0.096)
Post-election* One degree polynomial of days	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Post-election* Three degree polynomial of days	No	No	No	No	Yes
Socio - Demographic & MSA Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Sample	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans
Time restriction	+/- one day	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week
Observations	465	2,934	2,934	2,934	2,934

Note: Samples in Table 1(a) include only Democrats, while those in Table 1(b) include only Republicans. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the Metropolitan level. Socio-demographic controls include gender, age indicators, race indicators, and income indicators. MSA controls included indicators for the metropolitan statistical area.

161 STUDY 1: 2012 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

162 Tables 1(a) and (b) report the results for happiness around the election depicted
 163 in Figures 1 and 2, splitting the sample by partisan winners (Democrats) and
 164 partisan losers (Republicans). Across specifications there is little robust evidence
 165 that Democrats' responses changed immediately after the election. The sign across
 166 specifications is positive, but the statistical significance is inconsistent across
 167 specifications. In contrast, partisan losers experienced significantly larger hedonic




Figure 2

Self-Reported Happiness one Week Before and After the Election for Republicans with Discontinuity Model

Note: Dashed lines are ± 1.96 standard errors. The difference between the lines at the first day after the election corresponds to the β_1 in Equation (1). The differences in slopes of the estimated line are the consequence of the interaction between the linear term and the post-election indicator.

168 shocks than partisan winners. Table 1(b) shows a strong negative effect on the
 169 baseline level of happiness following the election. The models are robust to including
 170 extensive demographic (race, gender, age, income), geographic (metropolitan area
 171 fixed effects defined by IP address), and time control variables. This robustness
 172 across specifications casts doubt on concerns that results are driven by differences
 173 in the types of respondents before and after the election, as do the nearly identical
 174 respondent characteristics before and after the election presented in Table S1. The
 175 negative happiness impact to partisan losers, for example, actually increases from
 176 -0.151 to -0.246 after all controls are added. Across each pair of columns from
 177 Tables 1A and B, the coefficients are statistically different from each other at the 5%
 178 confidence level.

179 Figures 3A and B depict parameter estimates and confidence intervals associated with
 180 Equation (2). The weekly differences in happiness are all relative to the baseline
 181 8th week before the election and condition on the socio-demographic characteristics
 182 described earlier. Over the 8 weeks before and after the election happiness is relatively
 183 constant except for Republicans in the week immediately following the election. This
 184 evidence again shows that Republicans' well-being drops after the event, and also
 185 suggests that it recovers quickly.

186 Alternative Explanations

187 Three possible alternative explanations stand out. First, the asymmetric hedonic
 188 response could stem from rational responses to the election's policy implications




Figure 3A

Self-Reported Happiness for Democrats Eight Weeks Before and After the Election.
(Color Online)




Figure 3B

Self-Reported Happiness for Republicans Eight Weeks Before and After the Election.
(Color Online)

189 for Democrats and Republicans (Gerber and Huber 2009). This seems unlikely,
190 however, since Figures 1 and 2 show happiness levels converging within one
191 week following the election, becoming statistically indistinguishable within four
192 weeks.

193 Second, the asymmetric hedonic response could reflect different outcome
194 expectations. Overconfidence among partisan losers is common even in blowout
195 elections (Granberg and Brent 1983), partly because simply supporting a candidate
196 causes people to believe that candidate will win (Krizan et al. 2010). In this
197 alternative explanation, Republicans would be more affected because they expected
198 a victory and were disappointed, while Democrats, also expecting a victory, were
199 unsurprised. Supplementary analysis suggests a similar asymmetric shock for
200 only those respondents expecting their candidate to win, casting doubt on this
201 expectations explanation.

202 Finally Republicans may simply become less happy after an election, regardless
203 of the outcome. This alternative seems unlikely, but we cannot directly test this
204 hypothesis with these data.

205 **STUDY 2: NEWTOWN SHOOTINGS AND MARATHON BOMBINGS**

206 Two major national tragedies that dominated the media for weeks occurred after
207 the election: the Newtown shootings and the Boston Marathon bombings. Many
208 respondents answered the happiness/sadness questions in the weeks surrounding
209 the two tragedies, averaging 445/day for the Newtown shootings and 639/day for
210 the marathon bombings. These data are analyzed using the same strategy as with the
211 election data, defining the post-event treatment dummy by whether each response
212 was before or after the precise time of the event's first news coverage. Of course,
213 learning that one's party lost an election differs in important ways from observing a
214 national tragedy. For example, partisans are personally invested in and occasionally
215 involved in elections, while very few people are personally involved in national
216 tragedies. That said, of the 60% of Americans who identify with a political party,
217 only about 0.40% were personally involved in the 2012 election by donating over
218 \$200 to a candidate, party, or PAC (Opensecrets.org). Nonetheless, comparing the
219 hedonic impact of these two national tragedies to that of losing an election can be
220 insightful because they were the most affectively intense events impacting the mass
221 public during this period. This comparison serves simply to benchmark the hedonic
222 intensity of partisan loss, and cannot account for other psychological impacts such
223 as anxiety or fear.

224 Both the Newtown shootings and marathon bombings caused significant negative
225 hedonic shocks, but they are much smaller than those suffered by partisan losers in
226 the election. Table 2 presents the RD estimates for respondent happiness in relation
227 to the Newtown shootings. Across columns (1)–(5) the results are not consistently
228 statistically significant. The fully-controlled model in column 2 estimates a 7.6%
229 happiness decrease immediately following the Newtown shootings—only one-fifth

Table 2
Self-Reported Happiness Before and After Newtownshooting

Independent variables	Dependent variable: Are you happy today?						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Post-Newtown	-0.063 (0.039)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.076*** (0.029)	-0.062** (0.029)	-0.035 (0.077)	0.060 (0.061)	-0.100*** (0.034)
Post-Newtown*	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
One degree polynomial of days							
Post-Newtown*	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Three degree polynomial of days							
Socio - Demographic & MSA Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time restriction	+/- one day	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week
Parents & Non-Parents	Both	Both	Both	Both	Both	Non-Parents	Parents
Observations	695	5,304	5,304	5,304	5,304	1,216	4,088

Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the Metropolitan level. Socio-demographic controls include gender, age indicators, race indicators, and income indicators. MSA controls included indicators for the metropolitan statistical area.

230 the size of the decrease experienced by partisan losers. Likewise [Table 3](#), column
231 4, shows that happiness decreases following the marathon bombings by only 4.8%.
232 The statistical significance varies across multiple reasonable specifications.

233 Election outcomes are relevant to partisans' identities. As such, it may not mean
234 much to compare the hedonic impact of partisan loss to that of national tragedies to
235 a broad swath of respondents. We therefore assess the hedonic impact of tragedies
236 on those for whom the tragedies are identity-relevant: the Newtown shootings on
237 self-reported parents and the marathon bombings on respondents using Boston-
238 based IP addresses. The RD models are reported in columns (7) and (8) of [Tables 2](#)
239 and [3](#). As one would predict, these subsamples show larger impacts than the more
240 general sample. However, the effects are still only half those on partisan losers from
241 the election ($ps < 0.01$). The differences between the coefficient on Post-Newtown
242 in columns (7) and (8) of [Table 2](#) is significant at the 5% confidence level, while the
243 difference between the Boston and Non-Boston region is not statistically significant.

244 [Figure 4](#) presents the daily happiness and sadness results for all three
245 events (Presidential election, Newtown shootings, and marathon bombings) for
246 the identity-relevant groups (Republicans, parents, and Boston residents). The
247 visual comparison, combined with the regression results, strongly suggests that
248 Republicans' hedonic response to the election was larger than either response to the
249 two tragedies.

250 GENERAL DISCUSSION

251 People's social, physical, economic, and mental lives are shaped by their partisan
252 identities—and these social identities are widely and deeply held. The current
253 research vividly shows that these identities also have important consequences to
254 people's hedonic lives. Winning an election is fine, but losing one is painful, at least
255 in the short run. Losing an election appears to dominate the pain caused by national
256 tragedies, even among those particularly connected to them. While enhancing our
257 understanding of the centrality of people's partisanship to their lived experiences,
258 these results also speak to the growing literature in economics, psychology, and
259 other fields on the factors that affect well-being (Kahneman et al. [2003](#)).

260 In addition to expanding our understanding of the well-being importance of
261 partisan identity, this work makes several methodological contributions. First, it
262 tackles a causal political psychology question by employing a research design (RD)
263 that is under-used in other political psychology research (Shadish et al. [2002](#)).
264 Second, it leverages digital technologies that allow large-scale, yet granular, data
265 collection over time. One will notice in [Figure 4](#) the rapid adaption of partisan
266 losers to losing an election; of parents to the Newtown shootings; and of Boston
267 residents to the marathon bombings. As far as we know, this is the first paper to map
268 the contours of hedonic adaptation to societal events at this level of granularity. This
269 type of data source provides new opportunities for scholars involved in the study

Table 3
Self-Reported Happiness Before and After Boston bombing

Independent variables	Dependent variable: Are you happy today?						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(8)
Post-Boston	-0.064** (0.039)	-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.048** (0.022)	-0.050** (0.023)	-0.069 (0.051)	-0.048** (0.024)	-0.204 (0.144)
Post-Boston*	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
One degree polynomial of days							
Post-Boston *	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Three degree polynomial of days							
Socio - Demographic & MSA Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time restriction	+/- one day	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week	+/- one week
Boston Region & Non-Boston Region	Both	Both	Both	Both	Both	Non-Boston	Boston
Observations	1,360	8,939	8,939	8,939	8,939	8,763	176

Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the Metropolitan level. Socio-demographic controls include gender, age indicators, race indicators, and income indicators. MSA controls included indicators for the metropolitan statistical area.




Figure 4
Comparison of Salient Groups Before and After Event.

270 and measurement of happiness (Kahneman and Krueger 2006). Finally, by using
 271 hedonic reactions to multiple unrelated events that are each associated with distinct
 272 identities, we illustrate an approach to comparing the importance of different beliefs,
 273 ideologies, or events to people's identities with relatively high ecological validity
 274 (Settles 2004).

275 One of our main findings is that the pain of losing the 2012 Presidential Election
 276 dominated the joy of winning it. A challenge to making a general claim is the many
 277 idiosyncrasies to this specific election. First, the impact of losing the election may
 278 be specific to Republicans since partisans appear to have systematic differences in
 279 how they process and respond to information (Jost et al. 2009). Second, it is difficult
 280 for us to disentangle the role of party affiliation from simple candidate preferences.
 281 Third, since President Obama was the incumbent, partisan winners might have
 282 perceived retaining the presidency as maintaining the status quo, thereby muting
 283 the joy of winning. In this scenario, however, partisan losers would have viewed
 284 the status quo as not attaining the presidency (i.e., losing), making this status quo
 285 argument inconsistent with the results. It is also inconsistent with the robust finding
 286 that partisans expect their preferred candidates to win, even when the polls show
 287 that winning is unlikely (Granberg and Brent 1983). The current findings should be
 288 replicated in future elections to resolve these questions.

289 Furthermore, the results appear inconsistent with research suggesting that
 290 prospect theory's gain-loss asymmetry arises when people forecast their hedonic
 291 reactions, but not when people actually experience gains and losses with monetary
 292 gambles (Kermer et al. 2006). One possible explanation for this inconsistency might

293 be that partisans expect to win elections (Granberg and Brent 1983; Krizan et al.
294 2010), whereas overconfidence may be more muted for monetary gambles.

295 Finally, we note that although partisan losers appear to be only temporarily
296 affected, such transitive emotional shocks have important personal and social
297 implications. Card and Dahl (2011), for example, find that upset losses in football
298 games increased local domestic violence reports for a short period following the
299 game.

300 In sum, partisan identity is even more central to the self than past research
301 suggests. In addition to affecting thinking, preferences, and behavior, it also has
302 sizable hedonic consequences, especially when people experience partisan losses.

303 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

304 To view supplementary material for this article, please visit [http://dx.doi.org/](http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2015.8)
305 [10.1017/XPS.2015.8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2015.8).

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